My name is Miguel A. Buitrago. Welcome to my blog. If you want to know more about me visit my personal website. Thank you! Happy readings!!!

September 08, 2014

Manipulation of Elections or Mere Coincidence?


This is how Evo Morales COULD be manipulating elections. The first sentence has an emphasis on could because I am not sure whether what I am going to describe is an attempt by the Morales government to manipulate the outcome of the October elections or if it is just plane coincidence or merely the working pace of Bolivian bureaucracy (including justice). Certainly, the opposition strongly suspects the first, but the government must also be given the benefit of the doubt, or not?

In the following paragraphs, after presenting the facts which are relevant for the post, I will state some questions expressing the doubt or doubts I have regarding the government's actions.

The Facts

The first set of facts to consider are about the electoral tribunal - the agency in charge of the organization and regulation of the electoral process - which has issued a set of rules that affect the political campaign process. Based on laws number 26 and 18 (Electoral law and Law on the Electoral Organ respectively), passed by the National Assembly, the tribunal has issued resolutions N. 229/2012 and 347/2014, which regulate the electoral process and, particularly, the political campaign process.

The 2012 resolution mandates the electoral campaigns would be allowed to begin 90 days before election day and end 72 hours before. Further, all mass media organizations wanting to take part in the elections process would have to register with the tribunal, providing the personal information of a responsible person, aside from information on the media itself. In addition, political parties that wanted to make use of mass media could do so within 30 days and the 72 hours before election day. Moreover, each political organization has to present a "Media Plan" to the tribunal 24 hours before it engages in mass media campaign. In that plan, the political parties have to report with much detail when, where and how will they issue their media campaign. Also, in the regulation it is clearly stated that every political organization or political party is responsible for the content of their spots. The state media apparatus is to offer free of charge broadcasting of political campaign for all political organizations. This will begin 20 days before election day. The consequences in light of violations of this rules are harsh. For the political organizations, for the most part, are fines, but for the mass media the violation of a rule means fines and the exclusion from the process for the next two elections.

In addition, the 2014 resolution adds more rules to the process. Important to highlight for this post is that no media organization could broadcast between 90 and 30 days before election day the images or voices of any candidate. Also, during the whole electoral process, media are prohibited to broadcast the national symbols and colors. This last prohibition is also applicable for the political parties.

The second set of facts to consider have to do with the justice system. In the last months, there have been reports on several cases the government, through several district attorney offices, has brought against several opposition candidates. For example, the case against the mother of MSM's vice president candidate Adriana Gil. In the city of Santa Cruz, Gil's mother was placed under preventive confinement (as is usual in Bolivian justice) against corruption charges. Another recent example is the also preventive detention of Cochabamba MSM Senatorial candidate Mario Orellana, who was charged with falsifying papers. While Orellana is already out, the campaign had to be stopped because he was in jail.

On the other hand, the tribunal is also 'considering' a fine against Minister of Productive Development, Teresa Morales because the UD complained she was braking the rules by engaging in political campaign during office hours (which she cannot do). In addition, the accusation for which Orellana was in trouble highlighting how Morales asserts the G77+China summit was an electoral act has not been considered neither by the justice department nor by the electoral tribunal.

The questions

Call me naive, but these events make me suspicious, and therefore, I have several questions coming up in my mind. The Orellana case was from 2011 and the Gil's case from at least two years ago. Is the Bolivian justice process so slow? Why do these cases suddenly appear less than two months before the elections? Why are other cases that touch the MAS (presumably of corruption too) not being investigated now?

It is certainly problematic for the government that all these cases against opposition candidates are being brought up right before the elections. The opposition is certain that these actions, namely the detention of candidates or their families, are politically motivated. I think, they should give something to think about.

But, don't get me wrong, I am not advocating that these cases should not be brought to justice. If they are guilty, then they should be prosecuted. However, it is the timing that makes me think there is some type of calculation here. Why now? Why not six months before? one year ago?

Using counterfactuals

If the government (the district attorney's offices) had not brought up these charges against these candidates, the MAS would have less support than otherwise. Why do I say this? Well, a while ago, I heard Morales, in a speech, say that his party's objective was to capture 86 per cent of the vote so his government would have an absolute majority. Now, I believe Evo Morales when he says that. I is really not that crazy when one places himself in his shoes for a second. His record has been indicative of a rising trend in support for every election he has run. So, if he was able to capture around 65 per cent the last time he ran, what is to stop him now that he has at his disposal the machinery and resources of the government?

Of course, others might mention the fact that he is running in a multiparty system, the fact that he has been serving for two consecutive periods and the fact that not all has gone the way he wanted, would prevent such high expectation, but we are not all perfect. Besides, he has to demonstrate confidence to the public.


So what is the conclusion? There is no conclusion in this post! There is only skepticism on the actions of a government which has an ambitious plan and wants to realize it against all odds. The question remains, is the government trying to manipulate the electoral outcome? Why does it not take action against its bigger rival Santa Cruz governor Costas?

August 31, 2014

The Problem With the Bolivian Opposition


It is becoming increasingly obvious the coming general elections in October will present very little challenge to the Morales government. That is because, on the one side, the opposition seems to be doing very little to position itself as a real alternative to the current government. On the other side, things seem to be going just as the government wants.

The opposition has not been able to distinguish itself as a real alternative. Instead of closing ranks to challenge the MAS' hegemonic position in Bolivian politics, it chose to split itself in several groups (PDC, UD, MSM), which are now taking part in the electoral process with their own candidates, their own platforms and their own ideas. Now, one can only speculate as to why the opposition decided to divide instead of converge. Perhaps no leader was willing to make place for the other? The one sure result from all this is that the opposition's vote is effectively divided. In a system where there is a second round and where there are provisions that would prevent a second round if the winner has sufficient distance to the second placed candidate, to run separately and divide the votes an opposition would get seems just crazy.

Further, by dividing itself, the opposition seems to have renounced to present an identifiable ideology which could counter that of the government's. Morales and the MAS have been able to build a seemingly convincing ideological discourse on what Bolivia is and what it should look like in the future, namely indigenous, anti-neoliberal and anti-capitalist. What is more, they have been able to make that discourse the dominant one, which is most important in political terms. The opposition, in contrast, although it seems to advocate more moderate social democratic ideas, has not been able to reach the electorate with those same ideas and arguments. Instead, it seems incoherently determined to conduct its campaign with the strategy: politics as usual. This means merely to try to differentiate itself from the "opponent" by highlighting what the other does or has done wrong. Well, this might be useful in electoral campaigns in places such as the US, however what the Bolivian opposition is achieving with such strategy this time is, first, the alienation of the Bolivian electorate, and second, the closing of the ranks in and around the MAS and Morales.

Moreover, the opposition has not been able to respond to the needs and preferences of a relatively corporatist society, whose corporate groups have increasingly sought to gain political relevance and decision-making power. If there is one thing remarkable about the MAS, is that as the political instrument of the social movements, it has been able to fulfill its raison d'etre. That means, the social movements and the different indigenous groups have used the MAS (the political instrument) to gain power by "playing the democratic game." The MAS, on its part, has been agile and apt to gather and channel those forces towards the support of its political aims through its discourse and political as well as organizational work. In contrast, the opposition has concentrated itself on conducting politics as usual in the same manner the today discredited political parties did before Morales came to power. That is, they have built coalitions or alliances with the most diverse groupings, which most likely have the most diverse political interests, needs and preferences. These lose alliances have begun to show their inherent weaknesses through the rupture of such agreements even before the elections. Some of these groups have even allied with the MAS.

Lastly, the opposition does not seem to be able to rid itself from an association with the "traditional parties"of the pre-Morales era. The so called traditional parties, the MNR, ADN, MIR, NFR, etc., are still identified with what Morales calls the neoliberal era in Bolivia. Because the discourse today is strongly anti-neoliberal, any political organization associated with this era has a significant political deficit. Of course, most opposition leaders today have a political past as former members of the mentioned parties or even leading actors in those organizations. This linkage still weighs heavy on their backs. It is curious however, that this association does not seem to have a significant enough weight on the, let's say, recycled politicians within the MAS.

Looking at the same problem from the opposite side, it is also arguable that the opposition has difficulties due to the government's actions. First, the government has strong support because of all the benefits it distributes (jobs and financial resources). The government has been keen on highlighting the fact that poverty in Bolivia has been reduced because of the different bonuses (social transfers) it has created. Currently, the government has been discussing the increase in wages and the payment of extra bonuses for Christmas season. The implicit calculation is, if people can expect benefits from their support for the MAS, they will tend to vote for it and disregard the opposition's promises. Second, the government gives indigenous citizens, which makes up the largest group, a sense of unity around a discourse which includes inclusion, equality, indigeneity, decolonization, vivir bien, etc. Also, this sense of unity leads to a strong identification with the MAS as the instrument to gain power. Most of the groups in which the indigenous population is organized have recently expressed their plans to control their members so they vote for the government. They argue that a vote against Morales will be seen as an act of treason against the indigenous movements.

Third, and most important, it seems the government has the potential to heavily influence the outcome of the elections. These allegations (not only from the opposition but also from other organizations such as the national association of journalists) are largely based on the events in and around the electoral process. One way in which the government could allegedly be influencing the electoral outcome is through the control of the electoral tribunal. The opposition has been repeatedly accusing the tribunal of being partial with the government. For example, the UD has repeatedly complained the tribunal has not reacted to the many complains submitted highlighting how the government violated current electoral rules. For example, campaigning rules. Similarly, another example is how the tribunal has used those rules to impair the opposition's campaigns. Recently the tribunal passed a resolution prohibiting the use of candidate images and voice in any media before a certain date (September 12). This has been a major obstacle for the opposition because they have not been able to, one, criticize Morales, and two, to distribute their messages with their candidate's faces. Apparently, however, the tribunal does not see anything wrong when the president or vicepresident show their faces and hold speeches on TV cameras or radio microphones inaugurating a clinic or school or some other project around the country.

Moreover, the opposition has repeatedly highlighted the government's intentions to influence the electoral outcome by making use of government resources in its political campaign. Morales has been traveling around the country in government-owned helicopters, cars and airplanes, clearly giving him an unfair disadvantage against its opponents. At the same time, it has been making use of the government's own media outlets in order to send its message. Finally, the government is also, some times pressuring and other times directing, that civil servants significantly contribute to the political campaign with either money (part of the wage) or time (by showing up in every concentration there is). 

In conclusion, it is evident the Bolivian opposition has handicapped itself by splitting and showing a broken front which has not convinced the Bolivian electorate. However, it is not only the doing of the opposition which makes it difficult for itself to present an alternative against Morales. The government has been effective in trying to control, one way or the other, the outcome in October.

August 26, 2014

Elections 2014: Government Programs


The Bolivian website Gobernabilidad (Governability) has just published a comprehensive text in PDF format where they compare all party programs running for election on October 2014. For those Bolivia experts with Spanish knowledge this new publication should be interesting. This is the first time I have seen such a compilation of the programs for a Bolivian election. Here is the exact link.

For those English speaking only Bolivianists, here is a summary of the MAS' program. This is a lose translation, directly from the text in Spanish.

The MAS government proposes/plans, if re-elected:

Economic policy:

1. Defer the payments on Bolivian debt.
2. To use Bolivia's natural resources as basis for development through a participative development model (I have not seen more detail on what exactly a participative development model is)
3. To redistribute national income to increase domestic demand.
4. Plan and supervise credit to promote productive activity.
5. Recuperate and strengthen strategic enterprises (with popular participation).
6. Engage in infrastructural investment.
7. The reactivation of national industry.
8. Special treatment for value-added production and for capital goods needed to generate production output.

(this section has nothing on the agricultural and mining sectors, which are two important areas in the Bolivian economy. Both of them are politically charged, because the prices of primary products are rising and people are getting impatient as well as the mining sector tends to be the source of work for many poor Bolivians and the price of minerals is dwindling in the international markets. There is also no mention of how to deal with inflation, monetary policy, etc.)

Social policy:

1. Compulsory contribution of the private economy towards the development of the country.
2. Focus on the development of underdeveloped border regions and poor neighborhoods.
3. Creation of a national disaster center.
4. Health and education are a responsibility of the state.
5. Increase of wages and social bonuses according to a progressive scale.
6. Automatic medical care for the Chaco war veterans.
7. Extension in the social security system coverage to all.

(in this section the issues of immigration, housing, employment, social inclusion, are not included.)

Political rights:

1. Defense of the freedom of speech and expression.
2. Codification of aggression against the free press and journalists in the penal code.
3. Defense of democratic liberties, social rights (specially of the social movements').


1. Prevent the use of the police force in persecution, repression and torture.
2. Higher education for police officers with higher ranks.

(notoriously here is missing the issue of drug trafficking and drug production.)


1. Creation of a special commission to recuperate state property illegally appropriated.
2. Control and investigation of foreign accounts open by Bolivians overseas.
3. Control and investigation of acquisition of goods by Bolivians who do not have the means to acquire such goods.


1. The creation of a large political instrument (this means a party or political group) to further a political agenda.
2. Policy of relocation to populate border areas to address the issue of territorial integrity.

Foreign policy:

1. Formulation of foreign policy by the social movements (sounds like a corporatist model).
2. Deepen Bolivia's participation in Mercosur and CAN.
3. Follow a policy of good relations with all nations with similar objectives.
4. Adopt a peace approach.
5. Work to eliminate restrictive commercial exchange policies.
6. Maintain Bolivia's sovereignty of its territory.
7. Gain access to the sea.

Indigenous peoples:

1. Revert to the state unproductive latifundio and re-distribute the land in favor of the indigenous peoples.
2. Promotion of agricultural activity (of the indigenous peoples) through credit, distribution, commercialization, transport, insurance, etc.


1. Create a National Women Institute to promote advancement in the rights of women.

July 30, 2014

Elections 2014: Political Persecution?


Once again, coincidence or not, legal processes against opposition candidates are springing up. I think the question is relevant. Is there a concerted effort withing the government to take opposition candidates out of the race or at least damage their possibilities? Why are such suits coming just before the elections when, some of them, have been there for years?

Lets see, two first cases have come out recently. First, Juan del Granado, presidential candidate for MSM, has been dealing with accusations brought against him by the national office of the comptroller. The office re-opened (meaning the process was already there for some time) an investigation for irregularities in the construction of three bridges in La Paz while he was the Mayor. Del Granado has been cited to declare and the meetings have been postponed. He alleges political persecution to take him out of the race. In similar terms, del Granado’s Vice president candidate, Adriana Gil, has been dealing as well with her mother’s arrest under corruption charges. This time the regional office of the attorney is behind. She too alleges that the government wants to take the MSM candidates out of the race.

This post can be updated as more cases come to light.

Elections 2014: On Preferences, Voting Intentions and Polls


This is an attempt at following the voting preferences of Bolivians for the coming October general elections. The numbers you will see here respond to the question for whom would you vote if the elections were today or this weekend?

At present time, several opinion polls have been published, but they are a bit confusing. First, most make use of a different methodology and, second, in consequence, they deliver different numbers. For one, some make a difference between intention of voting and preference for a candidate and others formulate questions less accurately.

But at the risk of showing something irrelevant, I decided to follow the polls and see if they have something interesting to say.

Lastly, clearly they are less informative than the ones we had in prior general elections.

In the following table you will see the names of the candidates, the poll results in percentage and a bit info on the methodology and, if available, the date.

Evo (MAS)
Samuel (UD)
Tuto (PDC)
Juan (MSM)
Fernando (PV)
Tal Cual for Los Tiempos (July 20)
Ipsos for ATB (2 to 18 July)

Captura Consulting for Poder y Placer (eje central)
Equip. Mori
for El Deber
(July 19 and 28)

This table will be updated as the numbers come out.

July 25, 2014

Government Control of Citizens?


The Bolivian government has been implementing what it has called a program for controlling, and therefore reducing, gasoline and natural gas smuggling activities. The name of such program is B-Sisa, which translates to Bolivian System of Aut-oidentification, and is under the jurisdiction of the National Hydrocarbons Agency, a regulatory agency. The problem for the government is that, because it subsidizes these products, many people see this as an opportunity to make extra money. In addition, the government indirectly ends up subsidizing illegal activities such as the production of drugs, which make use of gasoline as well as the illegal/clandestine exploitation of some minerals.

Why is this important?

The objectives of such an effort are fine, the problem is on the procedures used to apply such control. Since mid-2013, all automobiles, heavy machinery and motorcycles owned by Bolivian nationals are obliged to obtain an RFID sticker or a card (in motorcycles something like a ring) with which the control should be implemented. The procedure is more or less like this. Every car has been registered (name, address, ID, car, color, model, car ID number, etc.) in the agency's database by agents located in gas stations. So, for example, a person filling his or her tank drove into a gas station and while or after he or she bought gas, an agent came and registered them and their car and placed the sticker on their windshield. According to some press reports, close to 900,000 vehicles have already been registered. Currently, the agency is in the process of registering heavy machinery and motorcycles.

What is the problem with such program?

The problem with such a program is that the state is able now to monitor (closely) the consuming habits of private citizens because they gather private and habitual information about citizens. First, it is a concerted effort among various government agencies. For example, not only the hydrocarbons agency is involved, but also the Ministry of Productive Development and Plural Economy, the Authority for Controlling and Social Control of Enterprises, and the General Directory of Controlled Substances. Indirectly, the ministries and agencies involved are under the supervision of the Ministry of Government and the office of the Presidency.

How do they monitor?

First, as mentioned above, the agency gathered private information on each citizen who owns or drives a car. The information gathered was name, address, ID, telephone, car make, model, car ID number, licence plate and color. In addition, agents made digital photos of each registered car. Secondly, with the aid of the RFID chip placed in the sticker, the state (in this case the hydrocarbons agency) knows who is filling gas at the moment, how many liters and where he or she is located. The chip, as soon as is recognized by the antennas installed in every gas station in the country, establishes a connection with the hydrocarbons agency's data base and pulls up the information gathered and the photo. When the transaction ends, the information is sent to the agency. That way, the agency continuously gathers more and more information and can ultimately monitor each individual driver.

What are the implications?

The implications are double-edged. While on the one side, the state might have implemented an effective means to control or prevent that gasoline or natural gas be used for illicit activities, it has also at its disposal a powerful tool to monitor some aspects of the lives of its citizens. The government itself mentions that one of the objectives is citizen security. In light of this, not only smuggling can be monitored at every station along the borders but also, since the information includes names, people who are crossing the borders for private reasons. Another benefit for the state is the monitoring of sales of each gas station. While this might sound good for consumers who think this type of control is necessary, the monitoring itself is a problem.

With this type of control/monitoring there is a significant amount of privacy that gets lost. For those of us who consider privacy and the liberty to move free and anonymously around, this is a true concern. The benefits just do not outweigh the costs.

July 16, 2014

Elections 2014: The First Potential Problems Surface


The five political alliances taking part in the Bolivian general elections in October 2014 have officially submitted their list of candidates for the legislative to the electoral court. For more on this please see the prior post. This post is about the problems already arising from the submission of such lists.

To start of however, a bit of context. As you know, the Plurinational Bolivian State has a bicameral system with a higher chamber being the Senate and the lower chamber being the Chamber of Deputies. The Senate has a total of 36 seats, with four seats for each of the nine departments. The lower chamber has 130 seats, with half being filled by the proportional representation method and the other half with first-past-the-post method. This, so called, mixed member proportional representation method is seen as the most fair, and not only by Bolivia. 

Having said that, shortly after the different political organizations submitted their lists to the electoral organ, there were already people complaining about the process, in particular about how the lists were filled. The major complain across political organizations seems to be that the lists have been filled not by consensus but by designation of some people in higher posts. That is, for example, one complain within the MAS. One supporter from Santa Cruz complained the names already agreed upon in a locality in Santa Cruz had been changed by two leaders of the MAS. The supporter complained the statutes had been violated because a seniority rule was not respected. An additional complaint was about the number of persons invited to run under the MAS. These people have recently become members of MAS. This means that people who have been in the MAS for a long time and wanted to fill a position were taken out and were replaced by some other person who was recently invited by some MAS leader.

Similar complains echoed within the MSM, whereby this organization does not pretend to principally open up spaces for participation for indigenous people while the MAS does. However, the basic pattern of the problem is the distribution of spaces (in this case candidacy posts) among the various organizations allied. Following this logic, if one organization does not respect what has been agreed upon, the alliance may run the risk of falling apart. The case of the UD, is similar but with one distinction, namely the political group has tended to recycle politicians from the traditional political parties and the MAS renegades. But essentially the distribution of positions in the electoral lists has been the glue keeping together (even the MAS) these alliances.

Two things need to be highlighted when looking at the lists, which you can access in the electoral agency's website. There are a number of family members coming up within the lists of candidates. The most conspicuous are the nephew of Evo Morales and the sister of MSM Vicepresident candidate Adriana Gil, who will run for lower chamber seats. I did not look at the lists careful enough to see other cases of nepotism? but I would not be sure these were the only cases. The second thing to be highlighted is the number of women in the lists. I think Bolivia has made tremendous progress in the area of women representation in leading posts. A news report says women make up 52% of all the candidates in this election. We should add that a significant percent of these have a real chance to being elected because they are incumbents as opposed to just substitutes.

Elections 2014: The Candidates are Set and Official Campaigning can Begin


This week was the deadline for the citizen groups, which will be disputing the general elections in October 2014, to present their official candidates lists. With the submission of these lists the candidates are set and officially allowed political campaigning can begin.

There are basically five groups or as we might call them political alliances, that will take part in the general elections. The most important is, of course, the current government's alliance Movement Towards Socialism - Instrument for the Peoples Sovereignty (MAS - ISPS). This alliance will be led by Evo Morales and Alvaro Garcia as President and Vicepresident candidates, respectively. This is what in Bolivian politics is known as the official side or in Spanish, partido oficialista.

As it was expected, the opposition could not agree on an alliance capable of making real opposition to the MAS. The result of all the meetings, negotiations and gatherings was the opposition being split into four groups or political alliances. These are: the Movement without Fear (Movimiento Sin Miedo, MSM), which placed Juan del Granado and Adriana Gil as President and Vicepresident candidates; Democratic Unity (Unidad Demócrata, UD), which designated Samuel Doria Medina and Ernesto Suárez as President and Vicepresident candidates; the Green Party of Bolivia (Partido Verde de Bolivia, PVB), which postulated Fernando Vargas and Margoth Soria as President and Vicepresident candidates; and lastly the Christian Democratic Party (Partido Demócrata Cristiano, PDC), which postulated Jorge Quiroga y Tomasa Yarhui as President and Vicepresident candidates. If you want details on these groups take a look at my prior posts about the Elections 2014.

A clear continuation of the trend set in 2002 and confirmed in 2005 is the absence of the so called traditional political parties. I am sure you noticed that when I mentioned the political organizations taking part in the elections I described them as groups or political alliances. The reason is because many if not all traditional political parties have lost credibility in the course of the last decade. That is the reason why politicians now tend to form, more or less, ad hoc political groups or alliances to be able to run for public posts. In the opposition, the only traditional party is the Christian Democratic Party, the rest are alliances. In fact, the most important traditional political parties to date, the MNR and the ADN, are about to lose their accreditation at the electoral court.

So there you go, the political landscape is clear (I hope, this is Bolivia after all), the candidates are nominated, and the campaigns are set to begin, right? Well, for the MAS and other alliances such as the MSM, the campaigns were already open some months ago even though this was illegal. But, heck, what is one more month or less?

June 19, 2014

Citizen Security: Taxi App Registers Taxi Drivers and Promises More Security


If there is one thing that affects Bolivians in their every day life and foreigners who visit the country is the sense of insecurity felt on the streets, especially at night. While Bolivia overall is, in comparison, a secure country to live in and to visit, the largest cities La Paz, Cochabamba and Santa Cruz suffer under a significant degree of insecurity because of crime. Aside from petty crime (pick pocketing, etc.) there are other types of crimes being committed such as violent assaults and robberies. Highly ranked among these are the crimes involving taxis. One example are express kidnappings, where an unsuspecting person stops a taxi, gets in and tells the driver where to go. Some blocks later, other people enter the taxi and with threats take the unsuspecting victim on a ride through various ATMs. The victim must withdraw funds. More often than not, these kidnappings can go on for several days. This is because ATMs have a withdrawal limit per day. Not a fun thing to go through.

That is the reason why security in taking a taxi, for Bolivians and visitors, is a high priority. Until now, people have relied on what Bolivians call, radio taxis. These are taxi companies as we know them in the US and Europe. Taxis work for established companies, which have good reputation and good relations with their customers, such as hotels, restaurants, etc. These companies have a lot to lose if something happens. Therefore, they are pretty safe.

This model of radio taxis has been very successful until now. Actually, I expect it to continue to be for the foreseeable future. However, there are some innovations to tell about. That is, in Bolivia now, more in the largest cities, there are two companies that have launched two apps to introduce themselves in the taxi market. These apps are Easy Taxi and Taxi Seguro (Secure Taxi). The two apps work like an app we already know in the US and Europe. First you download the app and register. Then when you want a taxi, you just tap into call a taxi. For taxi drivers is a bit more complicated because they have to register supplying more information about themselves. Taxi seguro goes a bit further and asks photos of the taxi drivers and their taxis and licence plates. That is because taxi seguro's focus lies on security rather than on other factors.

These two companies are pioneers in the Bolivian market. According to some press reports, they have some degree of acceptance in La Paz and Santa Cruz already.


Pagina Siete, Feb. 13, 2014

June 11, 2014

Elections 2014: The Opposition to Morales


On a January 10, 2014 post, I wrote about the possible opposition to Morales for the October 2014 general elections. In that post, I named three alliances/groups/parties that were shaping up to compete in the elections. Today, the newspaper Pagina Siete published an article bringing a bit more clarity on the shape of the opposition.

The report names six political groups/alliances that have been approved by the electoral office to take part in the elections. Nonetheless, the paper casually mentions there are twelve groups officially approved but only mentions the most politically relevant. In my opinion, it would have been interesting to get to know the other groups. For that reason I visited the electoral office's web site but could not find any relevant information. I find that ironic because they do make a point of conducting a transparent process. Well, so much for transparency.

However, we do know, with a bit more certainty (lots can change in Bolivia in very little time), the six most important. Aside from the already mentioned in my post (see link above), Movimiento Sin Miedo, Movimiento Democrata Social, and Frente Amplio, the report mentions the Partido Democrata Cristiano (Christian Democratic Party, led by former president Tuto Quiroga), the Partido Verde de Bolivia (Green Bolivian Party, led by Fernando Vargas), and the Nueva Alternativa Popular (New Popular Alternative, led by Fanny Nina).